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The indigenous challenge
In business circles, indigenous peoples in Latin America are perceived as an obstacle to oil and
gas development. However, there is more than that to the story. By Carlos Perafan and Dianna
Moyer, sustainable development department, Inter-American Development Bank

R

ecent years have seen a strong reaction from indigenous peoples’ movements to the way hydrocarbons businesses have been managed in South America. In Bolivia,
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s negotiations to sell gas
to Chile – to which Bolivia lost its access to the Pacific Ocean
in the late-19th Century – brought indigenous people onto the
streets of La Paz to overthrow the president and eventually elect
the indigenous government of Evo Morales, which is moving forwards with plans to renationalise the hydrocarbons industry.
In Ecuador, a decade-long litigation between Amazonian
indigenous peoples and Texaco over the ongoing effects of
an oil spill 35 years ago continues and, in another case, the
Kechwa community of Sarayacu has obtained decisions from
the Inter-American Human Rights Court (IAHRC) to suspend
oil exploration in its territory on the basis of the government’s
non-compliance with legally binding prior consultation.
In Colombia, U’wa religious-based opposition to exploitation
of the Samore block has seen threats of collective suicide.
This conflict also soured relations among stock-holders of
Occidental, prompting the US firm to quit the project; has generated profuse litigation; and polarised civil society, well beyond
the influence on the Colombian public consciousness of the
long-lasting opposition of the ELN movement to oil exploitation.
In Peru, a coalition of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and indigenous organisations bitterly opposed the
Camisea gas project and the national ombudsman is investigating health effects on indigenous peoples related to the
project. Although Ollanta Humalla’s bid for Peru’s presidency
in early 2006 failed, indigenous support was the cornerstone
of his constituency. With oil and gas prices soaring in international markets, incentives are growing for governments in the
region to change contracting standards and, for the first time,
indigenous peoples are playing a role in these arrangements.

Dispossessed and marginalised
Compared with the wealth of their civilisations and natural
resources in pre-Colombian times, indigenous peoples have
been dispossessed of their ancestral lands, marginalised and
live in poverty. The 400 indigenous-peoples groups that survived conquest and colonisation are highly diverse and encompass around 52 million people. They constitute about 11% of
the population of the region and 20-25% of the population
living below the poverty line (see Table 1).
Despite large-scale migration to urban areas and abroad,
an estimated 60-70% of indigenous people live in rural areas
and account for 45-50% of the rural poor. In terms of territory,
they occupy 20-22% of the region. Although most live in the
highlands, close to major cities where they are seldom affected
by hydrocarbons exploitation, indigenous peoples’ larger habitat
areas, or refugee regions, are beyond the agricultural frontier,
in lowland regions such as the Amazon and Orinoco basins,
the Chaco ecosystem, the desert coastlines of the north, the
Caribbean coast in Central America and the Usumacinta basin,
where most of the regional hydrocarbon’s activities take place.
For example, the largest part of Bolivia’s gas prospects lies
under guarani territory in Tarija’s Chaco region. The advance of
the extractive industries (not only hydrocarbons, but also logging
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and mining) into these areas has created great vulnerabilities for
the physical, spiritual and cultural survival of indigenous peoples.
Effects come in different guises: extinction, land dispossession, resettlement, contamination, environmental liabilities, and
impacts on economic subsistence and socio-cultural integrity.
There have been several cases of extinction of indigenous
groups driven by hydrocarbons exploitation, as in the case of
some hunter-gatherer groups during the Chaco war in Paraguay,
or of the carare-opón in the middle Magdalena river in Colombia.
Other groups were taken to the brink of extinction, but survived
as various Arawak and Carib-speaking groups in the Orinoco
basin, and Tukano speaking peoples of the Caqueta-Putumayo
basin. These processes have not always been caused directly by
oil exploitation, but are an indirect consequence of the intervention and are most often related to effects on territorial integrity.
In the case of the siona and cofán peoples of southwestern
Colombia, oil was found in the early 1960s in their scarcely
populated forested ancestral lands. Oilfields were established
between the Caquetá and Putumayo rivers. The workforce was
imported from Andean Colombia and oil towns thrived. Once
construction was finished, workers associated themselves in a
peasant organisation and invaded indigenous ancestral lands.
Although they were protected as reserves, the political pressure of worker-peasants increased and government gave legal
title to the invaders, granting only a small part of the former
reserves to the cofàn and siona, whose population by this
time had steeply decreased. The area is now one of the more
resilient coca-planted and guerrilla-ridden parts of Colombia.
Today, the focus of extinction effects primarily relates to socalled non-contacted or voluntary isolated indigenous peoples –
either direct descendants of paleo-hunters, or Amazon riverside
horticulturalists contacted during the slave-driven, Amazonian
rubber-extraction industry of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which escaped caucherías and sheltered in inaccessible
areas of the Amazon. Most of these areas are within Brazil,
Peru and Bolivia. Other isolated groups live in parts of Colombia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Guyana and in the Paraguayan Chaco.
As logging, mining and the oil and gas industry advance
ahead of the agricultural frontier, extractive-industry workers are invading territories occupied by isolated indigenous
peoples. Contact is catastrophic. The populations’ lack of
bio-defences to struggle against what we perceive as common

Table 1: Indigenous peoples in Latin America, 2005
(’000 estimated) % of national
Country
population
Bolivia
71.00
Guatemala
66.00
Peru
47.00
Ecuador
43.00
Belize
18.80
Honduras
15.01
Mexico
14.00
Chile
8.00
El Salvador
7.01
Guyana
8.03
Panama
5.98

Suriname
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Colombia
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Argentina
Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil
Uruguay
Total

6.03
5.01
3.01
2.00
2.00
0.99
1.00
1.12
0.20
0.03
11.00

Source: IADB
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diseases can be deadly. They also lack proper land-tenure
rights and protection from governments to shield their territories from the incursions of illegal loggers and miners. Brazil is
the only country with a strong system in place to deter intruders
into isolated indigenous peoples’ reservations.
Long-term environmental effects and contamination of the
natural-resource base on which many indigenous communities depend have been the focus of recent debates. In 1993
and 1994, two class-action lawsuits were filed against Texaco
for the pollution of the rainforest and rivers of the Amazon
in Ecuador and Peru during its intervention in both countries
spanning from 1964 to 1992. Although a US Federal Court
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, it is being heard in
Ecuador against Chevron (Texaco is now part of Chevron). The
allegation states that Texaco used obsolete techniques to dump
waste water from oilfields into rivers over 20 years, causing
widespread contamination and health disorders.
At Camisea, despite the use of new production techniques,
controversy over potential environmental effects continues – in
18 months of operation, there have been five leaks from the
pipeline connecting the Amazonian gasfields with Peru’s coast.
Perceptions of environmental impacts vary greatly between
indigenous peoples and industry, mirroring cultural gaps and
creating misunderstandings. In a case in Colombia, while the
energy ministry tried to explain to Tukano speaking peoples
that an oilfield would require only a small patch of rainforest
deforestation, Tukano leaders believed this small patch would
cause disease that would further open the gap in the forest.
Considering the history of non-planned, poverty-ridden shantytowns and colonisation activities that had risen around oilfields
in the region, the Tukano’s was a logical assessment.
Socio-cultural effects are also important. Lowland, indigenous,
traditional economies were previously non-monetary and based
on reciprocity labour and goods-exchange systems. Now theses
economies have been monetarised and are dependent on activities related to extractive industries. This dependency has failed
to generate development for indigenous peoples, as they mostly
lack the skills, capital and opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activities to provide services and/or goods to the industry.
Articulation to the monetary economy occurs through a segmented labour market, where indigenous women often engage
in prostitution and inisgenous men in illegal logging, as can be
seen in a place such as Pucallpa, Peru, on the Ucayali river.
Even socially responsible actions can be harmful to indigenous
peoples. For example, in 2000, a group of huaorani women
occupied PetroEcuador’s headquarters in Quito to demonstrate
against their husbands’ being contracted by the national oil
company. They complained that their companions were not
hunting any more to the detriment of household food supply and
were spending their money in liquor.
Sikuani communities around Cusiana oilfields in Colombia’s
Orinoco basin saw their population decrease because of extractive industries’ effect on their kinship marriage system. When
catering contractors hired sikuani women to work in the kitchens,
who in turn married oil workers or made connections to find work
in the cities, thinning the already small pool stock and leading to
the long-term decline of the sikuani population.
Although effects from the contamination of the naturalresources base are easily pre-identified in modern environmental impact studies and, theoretically, possible to mitigate
against, other indirect and socio-cultural effects are not so
easy to forecast and are left aside in governments’ and industries’ due diligence. This is not only the result of the lack of
specialised knowledge, but also an unforeseen effect of the
overwhelming advances in environmental studies that overshadow the socio-cultural aspects of these studies.
Furthermore, a grey area exists between the responsibility
of governments and that of the private sector to indigenous
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peoples’ impact management, where governments at the time
of releasing oil or gas concessions do not disclose either the
presence of indigenous peoples, their vulnerability, or the particulars of their culture (after 13 years of unresolved conflict
with the U’wa in Colombia, the government still lacks awareness of the religious aspect of their struggle). This leaves the
burden of accountability on the oil industry to carryout a role
that is often beyond its obligation, interest, or capacity.

Dealing with impact management
When problems arise, the focus is often on making deals with
indigenous families or local communities instead of carrying out
proactive impact management. This approach tends to develop
into long-term and cumulative environmental liabilities.
Some initiatives to advance the dialogue between indigenous
peoples and the hydrocarbons sector have been conducted. In
1998, Harvard University’s Ponsacs programme began furthering a series of oil dialogues between indigenous representatives
and the oil industry. Surprisingly, the meetings went smoothly,
as indigenous peoples and the industry felt they could agree on
issue identification and strategies to move forward.
With Inter-American Development Bank funding, upstream
mitigation was assessed, where the necessity to pre-qualify oil
and gas blocks before submitting them to public bidding was
recognised. Above all, the need to set apart cultural or environmentally sensitive areas from the blocks was identified.
The World Bank, through its Esmap programme, promoted
indigenous peoples’ hydrocarbons training programmes, fostered
national consultation regulatory frameworks, assessed environmental and social regulations and the distribution of oil revenues in Andean countries, and promoted tripartite meetings with
indigenous representatives, industry and governments. In 2004,
these meetings broke down because of a lack of interest among
the governments and differences between the Amazonian indigenous organisation and the national oil industry associations
– the result of misunderstandings driven not by the multinationals, but by their national partners and sub-contractors.
In terms of rights, contrary to what happens in Canada and
the US, where indigenous peoples have clear rights to the subsoil (although managed by state trust funds), in Latin America,
subsoil-mineral ownership is reserved by the state and hydrocarbons exploration/exploitation is carried out either by national
oil companies or is awarded/subcontracted to the private sector,
although some contention exists over indigenous peoples rights
over mineral resources and hydrocarbons. Originally, colonial
laws recognised the integrity of soil/subsoil tenure rights and
considered possession of ancestral territories to equal domain
title, a legal pre-eminent domain (land-tenure rights originated
before the existence of positive law) that has been reaffirmed by
the IAHRC and its Commission in recent cases.
Adding to that, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
169 Covenant, ratified by most Latin American countries, links
the scope of indigenous land-tenure rights to their own customary law. Furthermore, although short of upholding indigenous peoples rights to the subsoil when its natural resources
belong to a state, Article 15 of ILO 169 awards indigenous
peoples the right “to participate in the use, management
and conservation” of these resources and to participate in
their revenues, “when possible”. Although 95% of indigenous
peoples in Latin America live in countries that have ratified ILO
169, Article 15 is not yet enforced.
In this context, where indigenous peoples’ subsoil rights
and their enforcement are in a state of limbo, the only set
of rules with some level of liability is the prescription of prior
and informed consultation of ILO 169. Far from the right to
prior and informed consent that indigenous organisations have
been demanding, consultation is now an accepted standard in
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the region. However, in many cases, consultations either do
not take place, or are not properly developed.
In 1993, Colombia awarded Occidental a licence to operate
in U’wa territory after a meeting with a few community leaders.
This has been used by indigenous organisations to sue the
state for lack of proper consultation and they have utilised this
right as an instrument to oppose oil exploitation. One problem
is that it is very difficult to undertake proper consultations,
as space always exists to rebuff representativity, or cultural
adequacy. This creates a degree of uncertainty that hangs over
these processes and affects the juridical security of oil and gas
contracting. Paradoxically, the prior and informed consent governments are reluctant to award to indigenous peoples is much
easier to provide evidence for than adequate consultation.
A 2002 World Bank study on the distribution of oil revenues in
the Andean basin shows that Article 15 of ILO 169 is not being
applied in the region and that there are no direct mechanisms
to transfer revenues to indigenous communities (Colombia tried
to establish a 5% level, but that law was declared unconstitutional on other grounds and the intent has not been repeated).
Indigenous peoples are able to obtain part of the revenues only
through municipal allocation, or in other cases, as in Colombia
and Ecuador, through special oil-revenue-financed funds.
In Peru, the Camisea Fund, designed to finance development projects for the indigenous peoples along the project’s
pipeline, was changed by Congress into a municipal investment fund. At the same time, municipalities that receive oil
revenues complain about indigenous peoples’ lack of expertise
in putting together plans to apply for available resources.

But even in the scope of petro-nationalisation, it is uncertain
indigenous peoples will see a better recognition of their rights, or
find improved development opportunities. With nationalisation,
revenues are almost always syphoned off by the central government to support politically visible investments, instead of being
reinvested in cleaner and more efficient production technologies
– leading to greater environmental damage and contamination.
In the case of Campo Sacha, the biggest oilfield in Ecuador,
contamination from PetroEcuador’s processing operation is
significant. Campo Sacha discharges oil wastewater into the
Napo River and extracts water from the river to inject into the
wells to pressurise reserves. PetroEcuador uses this technique
because it does not have galvanised pumps that could resist
corrosion from the oil-contaminated wastewater.
Ducts that conduct oil from the rigs to the separation plant
leak. And while the project has to import diesel fuel at high
costs to produce energy, it flares gas, adding to the environmental contamination. PetroEcuador is unable to invest in
upgrading its equipment because it is required to send all of
its income to the central government. After that, by budgetary
law the state allocates resources for PetroEcuador’s management, but seldom provides for investment.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be guaranteed that
newly strengthened petro-nationalist industries will do better
in terms of impact management and indigenous peoples may
still find it difficult to secure a significant part of oil income.

Perceptions of environmental impacts vary
greatly between indigenous peoples and the
industry, mirroring cultural gaps and creating
broad misunderstandings

In 2000, in Ecuador, first the national indigenous peoples
organisation, Conaie, and then the Amazonian indigenous
organisation, Confenaie, tried an alternative. Given the paradox
that Ecuador imports most of its gas to meet demand, while flaring gas at Amazonian oilfields, they proposed to build a $60m
gas-processing plant in Sacha. They set up Amazonia Gas, with
Canadian first-nation firm Keyano Pimee, of Alberta. The third
party and proposed operator was Canada’s EnCana. Negotiations
broke down because of opposition from PetroEcuador’s labour
union and because EnCana sold its assets the country under a
tax-returns related conflict with the government. Internal-governance issues then ended the company.
Although this attempt to create an indigenous oil company
failed, it created momentum. It aroused suspicions from labour,
traditional indigenous leadership, environmental NGOs and the
left, and Confenaie was accused of being naive, as its business
proposal could open the door to rampant capitalism and further
intervention. However, other indigenous organisations – Conapa
in Peru and the Guarani Peoples Assembly in Bolivia – are
exploring the model. The conviction of indigenous leaders behind
Amazonia Gas was the perception that if indigenous peoples
were to properly influence governments and the oil industry to
manage their effects in a culturally adequate manner and generate benefits for indigenous communities from oil revenues, indigenous peoples must harness opportunities arising from oil activities instead of maintaining the traditional hand-out approach.
Nonetheless, the forces of petro-nationalisation that are
taking the limelight over any serious attempt for indigenous
economic articulation related to the industry seem to be capturing the attention of indigenous peoples. The hope is that
this approach does not result in a new disappointment. l

This issue raises another challenge – the foreignness for indigenous peoples of the development concepts on which these
funds are based. For example, no indigenous language contains
any word close to the meaning of development. This has encouraged the advance of concepts such as auto-development,
ethno-development or, more recently, development with identity.
Furthermore, among Colombian lowland indigenous peoples
affected by oil production, a concept named future-living plans
has emerged – a community-based, far-reaching, generational-timed reflection that tries to answer questions such as
“where do we want to be three or five generations from now?”,
or “would we be keeping our ways of life, or how might we
allow these changes to come by?”. Only when these teleological questions are answered and agreed on, will these people
be willing to define a development plan and/or particular programmes or activities. This methodology is spreading among
indigenous peoples in the region and Colombia has included it
in its indigenous peoples’ development-planning cycle.
Given the importance of oil and gas revenues to sustain and
bolster public expenses, the governments of the region have not
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice these revenues to protect indigenous rights competing interests are at stake. Ecuador,
for example funds more than 60% of its administrative budget
(which includes teachers and the military) with oil revenues.
This means any advance towards transferring oil revenues to
indigenous peoples creates governance tensions with the rest of
society, especially the military. This is important, because indigenous-military alliances that have developed in recent times
(Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru) are unable to solve this
issue and will have to fall-back on a save-face petro-nationalisation, instead of awarding any substantial rights or opportunities
to indigenous peoples for oil and gas drilling in their territories.
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New momentum

Carlos Perafan is an indigenous peoples specialist and Dianna
Moyer is a research fellow in the indigenous peoples and community development unit at the IADB. This article reflects the
opinions of the authors and does not reflect the official position of the IADB.
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